In this paper we analyze Libet’s conclusions on «free will» (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein’s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet’s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein´s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article´s conclusion is part of an ongoing research.

A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.

Ce texte est le fruit d’une collaboration entre un astrophysicien, Jean-René Roy, et un philosophe de l’éducation, Normand Baillargeon. Ils ont en commun d’avoir été marqués par la fréquentation des oeuvres de Mario Bunge, auxquelles ils attachent un grand prix, sur un plan personnel, d’abord, mais aussi, et c’est ce qu’ils veulent rappeler dans ces pages : parce qu’ils estiment que les oeuvres de Bunge contribuent de manière extrêmement forte et positive à rendre plus salubre la vie de l’esprit, en (...) enrichissant notre intellect et en luttant contre diverses formes troublantes d’obscurantisme qui y sévissent parfois, notamment dans les domaines familiers aux deux auteurs. (shrink)

It is well known that modern epistemology is a discipline that was left as a legacy by the great French philosopher René Descartes, and it is generally believed that it is a typically philosophical discipline whose problems can be dealt with only by philosophical (speculative) means of inquiry. Recently, however, the idea of naturalization of epistemological inquiry has emerged, and one of its most prominent advocates was Quine. However, the question is to what extent, if at all, the proposal offered (...) by Quine is tenable, as evidenced, apart from numerous criticisms, by significantly different interpretations regarding assumptions on which it should be based. Namely, three types of interpretations of Quine’s call for the reform of epistemological inquiry prevail in contemporary literature: behaviorist, which was largely advocated by Quine, but also coherentist and physicalist, which some of his interpreters argued for. However, while the first two of these options are in my opinion unacceptable because they are unable to provide the necessary autonomy for the epistemological context of inquiry, I will try to show that physicalism is also burdened with difficulties, albeit different ones, which make it an untenable position when it comes to epistemological inquiry. Nevertheless, even before I started writing, I thought that there were valuable insights in Quine’s proposal, and that we could learn important lessons from the failure of previous interpretations, both regarding the position that should be taken in its interpretation, and, closely related to this, the possibility of reforming epistemological inquiry in general. In other words, informed by the weaknesses of Quine’s proposal and its interpretations, I will argue that epistemological inquiry can ultimately be approached from one of two mutually incompatible theoretical positions: the traditional or Cartesian one, and the Kantian one. Given that, as noted above, Quine’s proposal was primarily a reaction to Cartesianism, I discuss the possibility of establishing the fundamental level of inquiry such as epistemological to which Quine had to aspire, but in a way that would enable the synthesis of his approach with Kant’s view, which is in my opinion the only genuine alternative to the traditional program. Although it implies taking a position that would be a kind of compromise and could not be attributed to Quine (which is why it is uncertain whether he would have supported this interpretation), I believe that, apart from preserving certain naturalistic elements, it is an interpretation that would ultimately satisfy most of the demands that Quine himself has set for epistemological inquiry. (shrink)

J.M. Coetzee’s book, 'Elizabeth Costello' is one of the stranger works to appear in recent years. Yet if we focus our attention on the book’s two chapters dealing with animals, two preoccupations emerge. The first sees Coetzee use animals to evoke a particular conception of ethics, one similar to that of the philosopher Mary Midgley. Coetzee’s second theme connects animals to the phenomena of scapegoating, as it has been characterized by the philosophical anthropologist René Girard. While both themes involve human (...) interactions with animals, each transcends application to that particular issue and raises deeper questions, respectively concerning the foundations of morality and the therapeutic allure of political violence. Making explicit these two preoccupations enhances our understanding of Coetzee’s fiction, particularly Disgrace. However, when Coetzee’s two philosophical strands are analyzed in their own terms, the ethics of sympathy is shown to be a more coherent notion than the understanding of politics he takes over from Girard. (shrink)

Review of Desmond M. Clarke. Descartes: A Biography. xi + 507 pp., apps., figs., bibl., index. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. $40 (cloth).; Richard Watson, Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. viii + 375 pp., figs., bibl., index. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. $35 (cloth).

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE OS CISTOS OVARIANOS EM VACAS Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 11. CISTOS OVÁRICOS Os cistos são cavidades anormais que às vezes possuem conteúdo de fluido biológico, ou podem ser cavidades ocas, com paredes sólidas refratárias à maioria dos compostos endógenos. Formam-se como alterações patológicas das células luteais ou foliculares do estroma ovárico. A presença de cistos altera o ciclo estral e obriga a (...) realização de tratamentos exógenos para remover o mesmo, fazendo com que a atividade cíclica da gônada retome sua normalidade (HATLER, et al. 2006). Alguns fatores de origem nutricional, tanto por deficiência de alguns compostos, como por excesso no fornecimento de outros, têm sido considerados como causas potenciais dos cistos, entre os principais fatores nutricionais podemos citar: 11.1 Fito-toxidade/fitoestrogênios Compostos vegetais, tais como plantas com elevado teor de flavonoides estrogênicos, encontram-se sob a forma de glicosídeos e têm a capacidade para modificar os processos reprodutivos devido à sua semelhança com os núcleos esteroides de hormônios femininos; são substâncias estruturais e funcionalmente semelhantes ao 17-ß-estradiol ou que produz efeitos estrogênicos (MENDOZA, et al. 2001). Pouco se sabe sobre os estrogênios presentes nas plantas e os níveis de fito-toxidade dos mesmos, logo na prática torna-se algo difícil de ser observado e atacado. Porém, a nível laboratorial, caso haja alguma complicação que afete o animal para além das capacidades reprodutivas, um diagnóstico aprofundado é o mais indicado. 11.2 Minerais 11.2.1 Iodo (I) Alimentos com baixo teor de iodo, provocam estros silenciosos nos animais e aumentam a incidência de quistos ováricos. O I é parte da molécula de tiroxina que estimula a produção de ATP na mitocôndria, a deficiência reduz a captação de oxigênio o que determina uma diminuição no metabolismo energético. Na tireoide existe um complexo de proteína-iodo, chamado tiroglobulina, essa molécula é uma glicoproteína. A maioria do I é reduzida a iodo inorgânico no trato gastrointestinal e a sua absorção é imediata. A função principal da tireoide é acumular I e fixá-lo, formando hormônios da tireoide sob o controle da adenohipófise por secreção (TSH). O I é convertido em iodeto no trato intestinal e então é transportado para a tireoide, aqui as células foliculares o prendem com efetividade através de um processo de transporte ativo, contra um gradiente de concentração, estimulado por TSH. Uma vez que as hormonas da tireoide controlam o metabolismo, uma deficiência em I diminui a taxa metabólica do organismo, isso afeta indiretamente a reprodução, uma vez que o funcionamento irregular da tireoide afeta a formação de lipídios, esses necessários para a produção de hormônios esteroides (estrogênios) e estes por sua vez influenciam a síntese das prostaglandinas F2-alfa necessária para o processo de luteólise o que faz com que o corpo lúteo não se rompa, perdure e forme um cisto. O I presente no alimento do animal deve estar presente e obedecer o intervalo de 0,34 a 0,88 mg/kg de MS em todos os alimentos que o animal viera a ingerir, seja forragens ou rações. A forma de suplementação são as mais conhecidas, via volumoso, concentrado, água ou pelo sistema SMI. 11.2.2 Manganês (Mn) Níveis elevados de manganês na dieta levam à depleção da absorção de ferro, bem como de outros minerais necessários para a síntese, metabolismo, ativação de enzimas e absorção de outros minerais. Essas interações com outros minerais e o papel do excesso de manganês na inibição da síntese dos precursores de hormonas necessárias para a reprodução, bem como dos metabolitos gerados durante o desdobramento ruminal são representados de forma indireta. Para além do efeito antagônico com outros minerais e enzimas, níveis elevados de manganês provocam uma alteração na população da flora ruminal, o que prejudica a produção de ácido propiônico e butírico a nível ruminal, tendo um efeito negativo no metabolismo dos lipídios com uma subsequente baixa de energia (derivado do metabolismo graxo diminuído ou inibido) e também da síntese de ácidos graxos. Por esta última razão, ocorre uma diminuição na síntese das hormonas esteroides, as quais, não estando presentes em níveis adequados, geram problemas no ciclo estral, uma vez que estas hormonas são essenciais para a síntese das prostaglandinas (PGF2-α) que são necessários para a lise do corpo lúteo, com sua posterior persistência, terminando na formação de um cisto luteal. Como sempre falado nos capítulos dessa compilação de trabalhos, o composto Mn é mais um mineral imprescindível para a alimentação do animal, manutenção normal dos seus mecanismos fisiológicos e relações com outros minerais. Sua disponibilidade para o animal deve ser de 12 a 50 mg/kg de MS das forragens, ou a mesma quantidade no conteúdo da ração balanceada. É um elemento que pode ser colocado na água para absorção pelos animais ou através da suplementação mineral injetável (SMI). 11.2.3 Sódio (Na) Os sinais de deficiência de Na são inespecíficos, mas os mais expressivos são sobre o crescimento e produção leiteira. Numa diminuição do consumo de Na, o organismo ativa os mecanismos de conservação mediados pela liberação de aldosterona que aumenta a reabsorção a nível dos túmulos renais deste mineral. A deficiência de Na afeta a produção de muco cervical, com consequências como problemas na formação de espermatozoides e aumento das infecções uterinas. Dado que a deficiência de Na é rara, apenas os sintomas clínicos desta deficiência mineral podem ser vagamente descritos é k caso da dificuldade de concepção, distorcias e bezerros fracos ao nascimento, além da inatividade ovárica e maior incidência de retenção de placenta. As causas de tais alterações foram motivo de numerosos estudos com resultados contraditórios, as vacas com deficiência de energia no início da amamentação têm diminuição nas concentrações de hormona luteinizante (LH), isto conclui que a alteração ovárica seria determinada por uma alteração da liberação pulsátil de LH devido a uma deficiência energética aguda. A intensidade e a duração do estro são de importância fundamental para a IA nos bovinos. Ao ocorrer uma deficiência de sódio, aumenta-se a estabilização das membranas celulares impedindo que o corpo lúteo se lise, formando-se um cisto, que continuará com a produção de progesterona, levando, por fim, a um anestro patológico. O sódio é um elemento que deve estar disponível aos animais de forma à vontade, ou seja, esse mineral é combinado com o Cl, fazendo o balanceamento eletrolítico e disponibilizado para os animais pelo conhecido sal. Sua administração, como é em sistema à vontade, não é muito controlada, mas o produtor poderá fornecer as quantidades na mistura alimentar do animal, tendo um maior controle da absorção do mesmo pelos animais. Sendo assim, o Na deve ser fornecido em quantidades que obedeçam 0,10 a 0,18% da MS no caso das forrageiras, ou a mesma quantidade misturada no todo da ração, quantidade essa encontrada por meios de cálculos, ou que já vêm na composição da ração industrial. Estudos apontam que um animal deve ingerir cerca de 50 gramas de NaCl por dia, no caso do sódio estar presente em 39% da composição desse cloreto de sódio. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS BARRENHO, Gonçalo José Pinheiro. Nutrição e fertilidade em bovinos de leite. 2016. Dissertação de Mestrado. Universidade de Évora. BINDARI, Yugal Raj et al. Effects of nutrition on reproduction-A review. Adv. Appl. Sci. Res, v. 4, n. 1, p. 421-429, 2013. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. CHAMBA OCHOA, Hermógenes René; BENÍTEZ GONZÁLEZ, Edgar Enrique; PESÁNTEZ CAMPOVERDE, Manuel Teodoro. Factores predisponentes para la enfermedad quística ovárica bovina y su efecto en la eficiencia reproductiva. Revista de Medicina Veterinaria, v. 1, n. 35, p. 17-28, 2017. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. DIAS, Juliano Cesar et al. Alguns aspectos da interação nutrição-reprodução em bovinos: energia, proteína, minerais e vitaminas. PUBVET, v. 4, p. Art. 738-743, 2010. FERNANDES, C. A. C. et al. Fatores predisponentes para cistos ovarianos em vacas da raça holandesa. Ars Veterinaria, v. 21, n. 2, p. 287-296, 2008. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. HATLER, T. B. et al. Effect of a single injection of progesterone on ovarian follicular cysts in lactating dairy cows. The Veterinary Journal, v. 172, n. 2, p. 329-333, 2006. KESLER, D. J.; GARVERICK, H. A. Ovarian cysts in dairy cattle: a review. Journal of animal science, v. 55, n. 5, p. 1147-1159, 1982. MAAS, John. Relationship between nutrition and reproduction in beef cattle. The Veterinary Clinics of North America. Food Animal Practice, v. 3, n. 3, p. 633-646, 1987. MENDOZA, R. Muñoz et al. Parámetros reproductivos en vacas Holstein alimentadas con alfalfa alta en cumestrol. Archivos de zootecnia, v. 51, n. 195, p. 373-376, 2002. PASA, Camila. Relação reprodução animal e os minerais. Biodiversidade, v. 9, n. 1, 2011. SARTORI, Roberto; GUARDIEIRO, Monique Mendes. Fatores nutricionais associados à reprodução da fêmea bovina. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 39, p. 422-432, 2010. SHORT, Robert E.; ADAMS, D. C. Nutritional and hormonal interrelationships in beef cattle reproduction. Canadian Journal of Animal Science, v. 68, n. 1, p. 29-39, 1988. THATCHER, W. W. et al. Strategies for improving fertility in the modern dairy cow. Theriogenology, v. 65, n. 1, p. 30-44, 2006. TEIXEIRA, J. C.; TEIXEIRA, LFAC. Alimentação de bovinos leiteiros. FAEPE, Lavras, 1997. YOSHIOKA, Koji; IWAMURA, Shokichi; KAMOMAE, Hideo. Changes of ovarian structures, plasma LH, FSH, progesterone and estradiol-17β in a cow with ovarian cysts showing spontaneous recovery and relapse. Journal of veterinary medical science, v. 60, n. 2, p. 257-260, 1998. (shrink)

O ensino de filosofia seguiu uma rota tortuosa desde a colônia até os tempos atuais. O breve histórico desse percurso tem o objetivo de reafirmar a necessidade dessa disciplina no currículo escolar, sobretudo porque sempre há aqueles que a consideram de pouca importância. No entanto, em um mundo cada vez mais pragmático, a formação exclusivamente técnica de nossos jovens dificulta o processo de conscientização crítica, além de desprezar a herança de uma sabedoria milenar. Os primeiros tempos No Brasil, desde o (...) século XVI, o ensino de filosofia fazia parte do chamado curso de artes oferecido pelos jesuítas aos filhos de colonos que concluíam o primeiro nível de letras humanas. É bem verdade que apenas alguns colégios dispunham desse curso, voltado exclusivamente para a elite colonial portuguesa. A base do ensino de filosofia era a tradição escolástica, e, mesmo durante os séculos seguintes, não houve interesse em abordar as conquistas das ciências modernas, já vigentes desde o século XVII, na perspectiva de Francis Bacon e das descobertas de Galileu Galilei. Do mesmo modo, não eram ensinadas as teorias de René Descartes e John Locke. Inspirado nos ideais da Contrarreforma, o ensino jesuítico reafirmava a autoridade da Igreja e dos clássicos, com o controle sobre as informações a que os alunos teriam acesso. No século XVIII, os fundamentos aristotélico-tomistas perduraram, com raras exceções, apesar de o marquês de Pombal ter expulsado os jesuítas. O próprio Pombal permitiu a divulgação de algumas dessas obras "esclarecidas", mas cuidou de elencar uma lista das proibidas. Contrariando o controle, as novas ideias circulavam no Brasil por meio de estudantes formados pela Universidade de Coimbra e também pela venda clandestina de panfletos e cópias manuscritas. Desse modo, nas aulas régias, instituídas por Pombal para substituir as escolas dos jesuítas, no geral foi mantida a educação elitista, livresca, desfocada da realidade brasileira durante o império e a república. Apesar do controle, havia exceções, nas poucas vezes em que intelectuais, professores e conhecedores de bibliografia atualizada ensinavam disciplinas como ciências modernas, filosofia e matemática. Algumas congregações religiosas, como a dos franciscanos, também se interessavam pelas contribuições científicas e filosóficas de seu tempo. Ensino de filosofia: entre facultativa e obrigatória A partir do século XIX, predominou um vaivém entre a filosofia como disciplina obrigatória ou facultativa. Com a criação de cursos jurídicos no Brasil, na década de 1820 - em São Paulo e Recife -, a filosofia tornou-se disciplina obrigatória do ensino médio, como pré- requisito para o ingresso ao curso superior, reforçando o caráter propedêutico daquele curso. Em 1915, uma reforma de ensino tornou a filosofia disciplina facultativa, mas o ministro Francisco Campos tentou reverter esse quadro em 1932, tornando-a novamente obrigatória. Conhecido pela atuação no movimento da Escola Nova, Campos aliou seus esforços aos de figuras importantes da pedagogia brasileira, como o sociólogo Fernando de Azevedo e o filósofo e educador Anísio Teixeira. A tendência escolanovista era renovadora e se fazia necessária diante da situação econômica do Brasil. Com o início da industrialização, surgia a necessidade de melhorar a escolarização, sobretudo para os segmentos urbanos. Francisco Campos introduziu as disciplinas de lógica, sociologia e história da filosofia no currículo escolar. Com a Reforma Capanema, em 19142, o ensino secundário dividiu-se em ginasial e colegial. Este último foi subdividido em científico, com ênfase no estudo de ciências, e clássico, que privilegiava a formação em humanidades. Nesse contexto, a filosofia se constituiu como disciplina obrigatória em um dos três anos do científico e em dois anos do curso clássico, com proposta de programa bastante extenso. No entanto, uma sequência de portarias reduziu gradativamente o número de horas-aula da disciplina, por fim, restrita ao último ano do colegial. Em 1961, foi promulgada a nossa primeira Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação (LDBJ, a Lei n. 4.024, ocasião em que o ensino de filosofia perdeu a obrigatoriedade. Período da ditadura militar Durante a ditadura militar no Brasil (1964-1985), as aulas de filosofia foram extintas pela Lei n. 5.692, de 1971. Essa lei reformou o então chamado ensino de 1º e 2º graus e introduziu o ensino profissionalizante, de acordo com a tendência tecnicista proposta pelos acordos entre militares e tecnocratas. Um dos objetivos era adequar a educação às exigências da sociedade industrial e tecnológica, com economia de tempo, esforços e custos. A educação tecnicista encontrava-se imbuída dos ideais de racionalidade, organização, objetividade, eficiência e produtividade, como se fosse uma empresa: esperava-se que, ao terminar cada um dos níveis, o aluno estivesse capacitado para ingressar no mercado como força de trabalho, caso necessário. Para implantar o projeto de educação proposto, o governo militar não revogou a LDB de 1961, mas introduziu alterações e fez atualizações. Enquanto a aprovação da LDB resultara de amplo debate na sociedade civil, o governo autoritário regulamentou as leis do ensino universitário (Lei n. 5.540/1968) e do ensino de 1º e 2º graus (Lei n. 5.692/1971) de maneira impositiva. Diversos acordos, conhecidos como MEC-Usaid (Ministério da Educação e Cultura e United States Agency for International Development), ofereceram assistência técnica e cooperação financeira para implantar a reforma. A habilitação profissional constituiu-se em um emaranhado de "ofertas" que chegavam a 130 habilitações profissionais distribuídas conforme os cursos e as regiões do país. Algumas disciplinas desapareceram, como a de filosofia, e outras foram aglutinadas. Por sua vez, a inclusão de Moral e Cívica no primeiro nível e de Organização Social e Política no segundo exerceu a clara intenção de doutrinamento político. Há controvérsias em torno da extinção da filosofia do currículo escolar. Para alguns, a extinção revelava a intenção explícita dos governos militares de evitarem o desenvolvimento do pensamento crítico. Outros analisam de modo diferente, alegando que, com raríssimas exceções, o ensino da filosofia reduzia-se à história da filosofia, com ênfase na memorização, não representando, portanto, nenhuma ameaça ao regime de exceção, por desempenhar papel submisso e nada subversivo. Além disso, de acordo com o viés tecnicista da reforma, havia necessidade de mais espaço para incluir disciplinas voltadas para a habilitação profissional. Já nas universidades, era possível notar o crescente desprestígio da filosofia, tendo ocorrido perseguição a professores, muitos deles exilados. Todavia, o propósito de formar profissionais, conforme propunha a nova lei, não se concretizou. A escola pública se fragilizou ainda mais, enquanto algumas boas escolas da rede particular encontraram meios de contornar a lei e oferecer um ensino de qualidade com os mesmos conteúdos que visavam desenvolver o espírito crítico e, portanto, a capacidade de seus alunos pensarem por si mesmos. Em 1982, no clima da abertura democrática, a Lei n. 7.01-114 permitiu a reinserção da filosofia no currículo como optativa, a critério do estabelecimento de ensino. Nada foi conseguido sem esforço, mas com trabalho intenso e pressão da sociedade civil. Associações especialmente criadas para esse fim aglutinaram professores de cursos secundários e superiores para promoverem encontros, movimentos de protesto e contatos com autoridades governamentais, no esforço conjunto para alcançar aquele objetivo. Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional (LDB) n. 9.394/1996 Após a aprovação da Constituição brasileira de 1988, restava elaborar a lei complementar para tratar das Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional. A primeira LDB, de 1961, levara muito tempo para ser aprovada e ofereceu no final um texto já envelhecido. Devido a esse fato, havia interesse em acelerar a regulamentação da nova LDB, o que ocorreu em dezembro de 1996, com a publicação da Lei n. 9.394. O primeiro projeto da nova LDB baseou-se em amplo debate, não só na Câmara, mas também na sociedade civil, além de várias entidades sindicais, científicas, estudantis e segmentos organizados da educação. O projeto original exigiu do relator Jorge Hage importante trabalho de finalização, já que a nova lei não resultaria de exclusiva iniciativa do Executivo, e sim do debate democrático da comunidade educacional. No entanto, com apoio do governo e do ministro da Educação, o senador Darcy Ribeiro apresentou outro projeto que começara a ser discutido paralelamente e que terminou por ser aprovado. Como ficou a situação do ensino de filosofia? Apesar do movimento consistente que continuava defendendo o retorno da filosofia ao ensino médio, foi grande a decepção. Vejamos por quê. Ao estabelecer as finalidades da educação básica e as diretrizes dos conteúdos curriculares, essa lei destacava a importância da formação para o exercício da cidadania, a difusão de valores fundamentais ao interesse social, aos direitos e deveres dos cidadãos e de respeito ao bem comum e à ordem democrática. Foi recomendado também o aprimoramento do educando como pessoa humana, por meio de formação ética e desenvolvimento da autonomia intelectual e do pensamento crítico. Conforme a LDB sob Lei 9.394/98: Art. 22. A educação básica tem por finalidades desenvolver o educando, assegurar-lhe a formação comum indispensável para o exercício da cidadania e fornecer-lhe meios para progredir no trabalho e em estudos posteriores. Art. 27. Os conteúdos curriculares da educação básica observarão, ainda, as seguintes diretrizes: I – a difusão de valores fundamentais ao interesse social, aos direitos e deveres dos cidadãos, de respeito ao bem comum e à ordem democrática; II – consideração das condições de escolaridade dos alunos em cada estabelecimento; III – orientação para o trabalho; IV – promoção do desporto educacional e apoio às práticas desportivas não- formais. Art. 35. O ensino médio, etapa final da educação básica, com duração mínima de três anos, terá como finalidades: I – a consolidação e o aprofundamento dos conhecimentos adquiridos no ensino fundamental, possibilitando o prosseguimento de estudos; II – a preparação básica para o trabalho e a cidadania do educando, para continuar aprendendo, de modo a ser capaz de se adaptar com flexibilidade a novas condições de ocupação ou aperfeiçoamento posteriores; III – o aprimoramento do educando como pessoa humana, incluindo a formação ética e o desenvolvimento da autonomia intelectual e do pensamento crítico; IV – a compreensão dos fundamentos científico-tecnológicos dos processos produtivos, relacionando a teoria com a prática, no ensino de cada disciplina. Por fim, ficou claro no artigo 36, parágrafo 1º, inciso III (revogado pela Lei n. 11.684, de 2008), que os conteúdos, as metodologias e as formas de avaliação deveriam ser organizados de tal maneira que ao final do ensino médio o educando demonstrasse "domínio dos conhecimentos de filosofia e de sociologia necessários ao exercício da cidadania". Embora a educação para a cidadania constituísse um objetivo visado por qualquer disciplina, com mais razão o professor de filosofia teria condições de abordá-la explicitamente, não só por tomá-la como um de seus conteúdos, mas principalmente pelo seu caráter problematizador e argumentativo, próprio da filosofia. Portanto, seria válido supor que o artigo 36 definisse a reinserção da filosofia no currículo, ministrada por profissional formado na área, o que de fato não se concretizou, e o ensino de filosofia permaneceu como não obrigatório. Posteriormente, conforme a Resolução CEB n. 3/1998, "as propostas pedagógicas das escolas deverão assegurar o tratamento interdisciplinar e contextualizado para os conhecimentos de filosofia e de sociologia necessários ao exercício da cidadania" (artigo 10, parágrafo 2º, alínea b]. Ou seja, professores de outras disciplinas seriam responsáveis por esses "temas transversais", orientação que prevaleceu nos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais. Um pouco antes, em 1997, dando continuidade a anseios de educadores, o deputado federal Padre Roque Zimmermann apresentara projeto de lei para tornar obrigatório o ensino de filosofia e sociologia no currículo do ensino médio. Após sua aprovação no Senado, em 2001, o projeto foi vetado pelo então presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Finalmente, em 2008, o artigo 36 da LDB sofreu alteração, tornando obrigatório o ensino de filosofia e de sociologia no currículo do ensino médio, por meio da Lei n. 11.684/2008. Na sequência da aprovação, continua em andamento a implantação desse projeto de ensino. Esperamos que o espaço conquistado não venha a sofrer mais tarde nova retração. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ARANHA, M. L. de A.; MARTINS, H. P. Filosofando: Introdução à Filosofia. 6ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. BRASIL. Ministério de Educação e Cultura. Ciências humanas e suas tecnologias. In: Orientações Curriculares para o Ensino Médio. Brasília: Ministério da Educação; Secretaria de Educação Básica, 2006. ______________________________________. LDB - Lei nº 9394/96, de 20 de dezembro de 1996. Estabelece as diretrizes e bases da Educação Nacional. Brasília: MEC, 1996. Disponível em: Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional - Biblioteca do Senado. Acesso em: 11 Jun. 2019. ______________________________________. Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais. Ensino Médio: Bases Legais. Brasília: MEC, 1999. ______________________________________. Resolução CEB n° 3 de 1998. Institui as Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais para o Ensino Médio. Brasília: MEC, 1998. Disponível em: Resolução CEB n° 3 de 1998. Acesso em: 11 Jun. 2019. KOHAN, W. O. (Org.). Políticas do ensino de filosofia. Rio de Janeiro: DP6A, 2014. (shrink)

This paper argues that epistemic errors rooted in group- or identity- based biases, especially those pertaining to disability, are undertheorized in the literature on medical error. After sketching dominant taxonomies of medical error, we turn to the field of social epistemology to understand the role that epistemic schemas play in contributing to medical errors that disproportionately affect patients from marginalized social groups. We examine the effects of this unequal distribution through a detailed case study of ableism. There are four primary (...) mechanisms through which the epistemic schema of ableism distorts communication between nondisabled physicians and disabled patients: testimonial injustice, epistemic overconfidence, epistemic erasure, and epistemic derailing. Measures against epistemic injustices in general and against schema-based medical errors in particular are ultimately issues of justice that must be better addressed at all levels of health care practice. (shrink)

It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics.

While there seems to be much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, some theorists recently express scepticism about unconscious perception. We explore here two kinds of such scepticism: Megan Peters and Hakwan Lau's experimental work regarding the well-known problem of the criterion -- which seems to show that many purported instances of unconscious perception go unreported but are weakly conscious -- and Ian Phillips' theoretical consideration, which he calls the 'problem of attribution' -- the worry that many (...) purported examples of unconscious perception are not perceptual, but rather merely informational and subpersonal. We argue that these concerns do not undermine the evidence for unconscious perception and that this sceptical approach results in a dilemma for the sceptic, who must either deny that there is unconscious mentality generally or explain why perceptual states are unique in the mind such that they cannot occur unconsciously. Both options, we argue, are problematic. (shrink)

Slurs possess interesting linguistic properties and so have recently attracted the attention of linguists and philosophers of language. For instance the racial slur "nigger" is explosively derogatory, enough so that just hearing it mentioned can leave one feeling as if they have been made complicit in a morally atrocious act.. Indeed, the very taboo nature of these words makes discussion of them typically prohibited or frowned upon. Although it is true that the utterance of slurs is illegitimate and derogatory in (...) most contexts, sufficient evidence suggests that slurs are not always or exclusively used to derogate. In fact, slurs are frequently picked up and appropriated by the very in-group members that the slur was originally intended to target. This might be done, for instance, as a means for like speakers to strengthen in-group solidarity. So an investigation into the meaning and use of slurs can give us crucial insight into how words can be used with such derogatory impact, and how they can be turned around and appropriated as vehicles of rapport in certain contexts among in-group speakers. In this essay I will argue that slurs are best characterized as being of a mixed descriptive/expressive type. Next, I will review the most influential accounts of slurs offered thus far, explain their shortcomings, then provide a new analysis of slurs and explain in what ways it is superior to others. Finally, I suggest that a family-resemblance conception of category membership can help us achieve a clearer understanding of the various ways in which slurs, for better or worse, are actually put to use in natural language discourse. (shrink)

Binding specificity is a centrally important concept in molecular biology, yet it has received little philosophical attention. Here I aim to remedy this by analyzing binding specificity as a causal property. I focus on the concept’s role in drug design, where it is highly prized and hence directly studied. From a causal perspective, understanding why binding specificity is a valuable property of drugs contributes to an understanding of causal selection—of how and why scientists distinguish between causes, not just causes from (...) noncauses. In particular, the specificity of drugs is precisely what underwrites their value as experimental interventions on biological processes. (shrink)

In this paper, we developed an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) for detect the absence or presence of lung cancer in human body. Symptoms were used to diagnose the lung cancer, these symptoms such as Yellow fingers, Anxiety, Chronic Disease, Fatigue, Allergy, Wheezing, Coughing, Shortness of Breath, Swallowing Difficulty and Chest pain. They were used and other information about the person as input variables for our ANN. Our ANN established, trained, and validated using data set, which its title is “survey lung (...) cancer”. Model evaluation showed that the ANN model is able to detect the absence or presence of lung cancer with 96.67 % accuracy. (shrink)

According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population (...) contexts. (shrink)

Not focusing on the history of classical logic, this book provides discussions and quotes central passages on its origins and development, namely from a philosophical perspective. Not being a book in mathematical logic, it takes formal logic from an essentially mathematical perspective. Biased towards a computational approach, with SAT and VAL as its backbone, this is an introduction to logic that covers essential aspects of the three branches of logic, to wit, philosophical, mathematical, and computational.

Since it is only five years since the publication of our paper, "Geographical categories: An ontological investigation" (Smith and Mark 2001), it seems somewhat strange to be making retrospective comments on the piece. Nevertheless, the field is moving quickly, and much has happened since the article appeared. A large number of papers have already cited the work, which suggests that there is a seam here that people find worthy of being mined. In this short essay, we first review the paper (...) and attempt to assess its significance from the perspective of our current work. We then put the paper in the context of our individual and joint works, which led up to it, and summarize our research trajectories since the paper appeared, pointing out what some of this reveals about spatial ontology in general. We conclude with some remarks on the future of ontological research in geographical information science. (shrink)

MMA fighting in a competition is not necessarily wrong and is often, as far as we can tell, permissible. Our argument has two premises. First, if an act does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint, then it is morally permissible. Second, MMA-violence does not infringe on anyone’s moral right or violate another side-constraint. The first premise rested on two assumptions. First, if a person does a wrong act, then he wrongs someone. Second, if one person wrongs (...) a second, then the first infringes on the second’s right. We then looked at Nicholas Dixon’s powerful Kantian argument that MMA fighting is wrong. (shrink)

I critically examine the semantic view of theories to reveal the following results. First, models in science are not the same as models in mathematics, as holders of the semantic view claim. Second, when several examples of the semantic approach are examined in detail no common thread is found between them, except their close attention to the details of model building in each particular science. These results lead me to propose a deflationary semantic view, which is simply that model construction (...) is an important component of theorizing in science. This deflationary view is consistent with a naturalized approach to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

This article provides an original account of slurs and how they may be differentially used by in-group and out-group speakers. Slurs are first distinguished from other terms and their role in social interaction is discussed. A new distinction is introduced between three different uses of slurs : the paradigmatic derogatory use, non-paradigmatic derogatory use, and non-paradigmatic non-derogatory use. I then account for their literal meaning and explain how a family-resemblance conception of category membership can clarify our understanding of the various (...) natural-language uses of slurs, -. The focus is restricted primarily to race-based and sex-based slurs used in the context of English speakers, and the article concludes with desiderata to be met by any subsequent analyses of slurs. (shrink)

Is a social complex identical to many united people or is it a group entity in addition to the people? For specificity, I will assume that a social complex is a plural subject in Margaret Gilbert’s sense. By appeal to my theory of Aspects, according to which there can be qualitative difference without numerical difference, I give an answer that is a middle way between metaphysical individualism and metaphysical holism. This answer will enable answers to two additional metaphysical questions: (i) (...) how can two social complexes have all the same members and (ii) how can there be a social complex of social complexes? (shrink)

This article explores Fanon's thought on dance, beginning with his explicit treatment of it in Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth. It then broadens to consider his theorization of Black embodiment in racist and colonized societies, considering how these analyses can be reformulated as a phenomenology of dance. This will suggest possibilities for fruitful encounters between the two domains in which (a) dance can be valorized while (b) opening up sites of resignification and resistance for Black (...) persons and communities-including a revalorization of Black embodiment as a kind of empowering danced experience. (shrink)

Part of a larger project of constructing a new, historically informed philosophy of dance, built on four phenomenological constructs that I call “Moves,” this essay concerns the third Move, “grace.” The etymology of the word “grace” reveals the entwined meanings of pleasing quality and authoritative power, which may be combined as “beautiful force.” I examine the treatments of grace in German philosopher Friedrich Schiller, who understands it as playful, naive transformation of matter; and in American philosopher John Dewey, for whom (...) it represents rhythmic organism/environment reversal. I conclude by showing how “grace” can be used in analyzing various types of dance, which in turn suggests transformational potential for philosophy, dance, and society as a whole. (shrink)

This essay is part of a larger project in which I construct a new, historically-informed, social justice-centered philosophy of dance, centered on four central phenomenological constructs, or “Moves.” This essay in particular is about the fourth Move, “resilience.” More specifically, I explore how Judith Butler engages with the etymological aspects of this word, suggesting that resilience involves a productive form of madness and a healthy form of compulsion, respectively. I then conclude by showing how “resilience” can be used in the (...) analysis of various Wittgensteinian “families” of dance, which in turn could facilitate positive educational changes in philosophy, dance and society, with particular efficacy on the axis of gender. In brief, by teaching a conception of strength as vulnerability (instead of machismo’s view of strength as apathetic “toughness”), a pedagogy of dancing resilience provides additional support for feminists (including Anzaldúa, Haraway, Butler and Concepción) who advocate a cautious openness toward seemingly-unlikely resources and allies (including analytic methodologies, Machiavellian politics, and the discourses of the natural sciences). (shrink)

Moral and political forms of constructivism accord to people strong, “constitutive” forms of discursive standing and so build on, or express, a commitment to discursive respect. The paper explores dimensions of discursive respect, i.e., depth, scope, and purchase; it addresses tenuous interdependencies between them; on this basis, it identifies limitations of the idea of discursive respect and of constructivism. The task of locating discursive respect in the normative space defined by its three dimensions is partly, and importantly, an ethical task (...) that is beyond constructivism. Interdependencies between these dimensions call into question the possibility of a plausible and coherent form of discursive respect that is deep, inclusive in scope, and rich in purchase. This does not mean that we should reject discursive respect, or constructivism, for that matter. But it suggests that the task of reconciling the dimensions of discursive respect may not allow for widely shareable results. This task needs to be addressed on non-constructivist grounds. Accordingly, we have reasons to concede that constitutive forms of discursive standing are less fundamental in the order of justification than weaker, “derivative” forms, and this is so especially if we take constitutive standing to mark an important good. (shrink)

Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid (...) them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking. (shrink)

This paper assesses the role of the Refutation of Idealism within the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as its relation to the treatment of idealism in the First Edition and to transcendental idealism more generally. It is argued that the Refutation is consistent with the Fourth Paralogism and that it can be considered as an extension of the Transcendental Deduction. While the Deduction, considered on its own, constitutes a 'regressive argument', the Refutation allows us to turn the Transcendental Analytic (...) into a 'progressive argument' that proceeds by the synthetic method. (shrink)

How is it possible for David Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. Hume makes the (...) same distinction, only he extends the sort of assent involved in daily life to theoretical matters as well. He is a skeptic both in finding no reason to grant the first sort of assent and in being subject to the second. (shrink)

I argue via examples that there are cases in which things that are not two distinct things qualitatively differ without contradiction. In other words, there are cases in which something differs from itself. Standard responses to such cases are to divide the thing into distinct parts, or to conceive of the thing under different descriptions, or to appeal to different times, or to deny that the property had is the property lacked. I show these responses to be unsatisfactory. I then (...) gather and systematize available ways of talking about such cases with phrases like ‘insofar as’, ‘qua’, ‘to the extent that’, ‘in some respect’, etc., while paying special attention to the scope of ‘not’ when used with these phrases. This allows me to show how we can speak of self-differing without contradiction. (shrink)

This contribution provides an assessment of the epistemological role of scientific models. The prevalent view that all scientific models are representations of the world is rejected. This view points to a unified way of resolving epistemic issues for scientific models. The emerging consensus in philosophy of science that models have many different epistemic roles in science is presented and defended.

I argue that the offense generation pattern of slurring terms parallels that of impoliteness behaviors, and is best explained by appeal to similar purely pragmatic mechanisms. In choosing to use a slurring term rather than its neutral counterpart, the speaker signals that she endorses the term. Such an endorsement warrants offense, and consequently slurs generate offense whenever a speaker's use demonstrates a contrastive preference for the slurring term. Since this explanation comes at low theoretical cost and imposes few constraints on (...) an account of the semantics of slurs, this suggests that we should not require semantic accounts to provide an independent explanation of the offense profile. (shrink)

Are living organisms--as Descartes argued--just machines? Or is the nature of life such that it can never be fully explained by mechanistic models? In this thought-provoking and controversial book, eminent geophysicist Walter M. Elsasser argues that the behavior of living organisms cannot be reduced to physico-chemical causality. Suggesting that molecular biology today is at the same point as Newtonian physics on the eve of the quantum revolution, Elsasser lays the foundation for a theoretical biology that points the way toward a (...) natural philosophy of organic life. Explicitly repudiating "vitalism" (the notion that the laws of nature need to be modified when applied to living organisms), Elsasser argues instead that the structural complexity of even a single living cell is "transcomputational"--that is, beyond the power of any imaginable system to compute. Beginning from this insight, Elsasser leads the reader through a step-by-step process that ultimately arrives at the conclusion that living and non-living matter are separated by "a no-man's land of irrationality." Trained in Germany as a physicist, Elsasser first pondered the implications of quantum mechanics for biology as early as 1951. The more closely he studied the inherent complexity of life, the more skeptical he became of the reductionist view of organisms as tiny machines. "An organism," he concluded, "is a source of causal chains which cannot be traced beyond a terminal point because they are lost in the unfathomable complexity of the organism." Like the physicist who works within the bounds of an unfathomable universe, Elsasser argues, the biologist must seek answers within a system that is no less unfathomable. (shrink)

Although they were never to meet and corresponded only briefly, Catharine Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft shared a mutual admiration and a strong intellectual bond. Macaulay’s work had a profound and lasting effect on Wollstonecraft, and she developed and expanded on many of Macaulay’s ideas. While she often took these in a different direction, there remains a great synergy between their ideas to the extent that we can understand Wollstonecraft’s own feminist arguments by approaching them through the frameworks and ideas that (...) Macaulay provided. These included the principles of classical republicanism, particularly in its understanding of the values of freedom, equality and virtue, and an understanding of reason as grounded in immutable principles that apply equally to both sexes. On the question of women’s freedom and social equality with men, I argue that though Macaulay sets up the problem in far richer and more detailed philosophical terms, in the end it is Wollstonecraft that has the more compelling account of its far-reaching social implications and of how this might be addressed. (shrink)

In “The Semantics of Racial Slurs,” an article recently published in Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, Hedger draws upon Kaplan’s distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. Here I review the key considerations presented by Hedger in support of his purely expressive account of slurs and provide clear reasons for why it must ultimately be rejected. After reviewing the key cases Hedger offers for consideration in support of his view that slurs are (...) expressions with purely expressive content, this article provides a critical evaluation of these cases, pointing out at least 13 ways in which his purely expressive analysis of slurs fails. In considering the 13 ways in which the purely expressive analysis of slurs remains inadequate, this article concludes with the suggestion that an adequate account of slurs will ultimately involve not only an expressive aspect but a descriptive aspect also. (shrink)

This article surveys the state of the literature on Hume’s epistemology, focusing on treatments of what has come to be known as the ‘Kemp Smith problem’, that is, the problem of reconciling Hume’s scepticism with his naturalism. It first surveys the literature on this issue with regard to the Treatise, moving on to briefly compare the Treatise and the Enquiry in virtue of their epistemological frameworks, before finally examining the literature with regard to the first Enquiry.

In this chapter, I will offer a strategic new interpretation of Hannah Arendt's conception of forgiveness. In brief, I propose understanding Arendt as suggesting—not that evil is objectively banal, or a mere failure of imagination—but instead that it is maximally forgiveness-facilitating to understand the seemingly unforgivable as merely a failure of imagination. In other words, we must so expand our imaginative powers (what Arendt terms “enlarged mentality”) by creatively imagining others as merely insufficiently unimaginative, all in order to reimagine them (...) as beings whom we are willing and able to forgive. It is in this sense that I understand forgiveness for Arendt as a kind of “magic.” That is, forgiveness involves the imaginatively-funded creation of a new reality by merely naming it, like the phenomenon of “magic thinking,” wherein one believes one’s thoughts or speech are immediately realized in the world. The magic of forgiveness, in other words, is an incantation or performative speech act, based on the forgiver’s choice to “make believe,” or pretend-into-being, that the forgiven person is forgivable qua thoughtless. (shrink)

According to the “internal” conception (Quong), political liberalism aims to be publicly justifiable only to people who are reasonable in a special sense specified and advocated by political liberalism itself. One advantage of the internal conception allegedly is that it enables liberalism to avoid perfectionism. The paper takes issue with this view. It argues that once the internal conception is duly pitched at its fundamental, metatheoretical level and placed in its proper discursive context, it emerges that it comes at the (...) cost of public dogma. The paper examines this problem and argues that a plausible response to this problem is to go beyond the internal conception and adopt a more inclusive, dynamic conception. But this calls for a form of perfectionism. Thus, the internal conception of political liberalism, far from showing how liberalism can be had without perfectionism, effectively calls for perfectionism as a remedy for its problems. (shrink)

Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents' entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can (...) take. (shrink)

In recent analytic literature on the Trinity we have seen a variety of "social" models of the Trinity. By contrast there are few "non-­‐social" models. One prominent "non-­‐social" view is Brian Leftow's "Latin Trinity." I argue that the name of Leftow's model is not sufficiently descriptive in light of diverse models within Latin speaking theology. Next, I develop a new "non-­‐social" model that is inspired by Richard of St. Victor's description of a person in conjunction with my appropriating insights about (...) indexicals from David Kaplan and John Perry. I point out that the copula in tokens of statements like, "I am the Father," is an ambiguous term and when used by a certain divine person a different proposition is affirmed. Central to this model is the claim that the copula bears the "is of identity" and the "is of numerical sameness without identity." Further, I show that Leftow's model employs two concepts of "person," a Lockean one and a Boethian one, and mine employs Richard of St. Victor's. I describe Leftow's model as a "hard non-­‐social" model and mine as a "soft non-­‐social" model that is nearer to some social models. I conclude that Leftow's model is not the lone candidate among "non-­‐social" models and that the variety of "non-­‐social" models has yet to be exhausted. (shrink)

The paper advances a non-orthodox reading of political liberalism’s view of political legitimacy, the view of public political justification that comes with it, and the idea of the reasonable at the heart of these views. Political liberalism entails that full discursive standing should be accorded only to people who are reasonable in a substantive sense. As the paper argues, this renders political liberalism dogmatic and exclusivist at the level of arguments for or against normative theories of justice. Against that background, (...) the paper considers aspects of a more plausible, deeper and more inclusive idea of public political justification that builds on a thinner, potentially cosmopolitan idea of the reasonable. The paper considers what content such an idea may have, and identifies a method of inclusive abstraction through which it may be enriched in content to render it fruitful for the purposes of a justification of principles of political justice. But the move toward more depth and inclusiveness faces constructivism with two challenges. First, inclusivism about the scope of political justification might not be able to avoid dogmatism unless it invokes perfectionist considerations. And second, the authority and appeal of a fruitfully rich idea of the reasonable depends on whether the addressees of political justification already value wide acceptability. (shrink)

Dance receives relatively little attention in the history of philosophy. My strategy for connecting that history to dance consists in tracing a genealogy of its dance-relevant moments. In preparation, I perform a phenomenological analysis of my own eighteen years of dance experience, in order to generate a small cluster of central concepts or “Moves” for elucidating dance. At this genealogical-phenomenological intersection, I find what I term “positure” most helpfully treated in Plato, Aristotle and Nietzsche; “gesture” similarly in Condillac, Mead and (...) Kristeva; “grace” in Avicenna, Schiller and Dewey; and “resilience” in Fanon, (Judith) Butler and Deleuze. With these analyses in place, I apply the four Moves in analyzing various forms of dancing (including salsa dancing and the pollen dance of the honeybee) and coordinate them to outline a comprehensive philosophy of dance. This philosophy points to certain conditions for an ideally flourishing, dancing society. And these conditions create the possibility for a coalition of sympathetic discourses (including critical race theory, queer theory, disability studies and democratic theory) united in pursuit of political virtue. The development of a philosophy of dance offers a deeper understanding of the intellectual values of a practice often identified with bodily immediacy and therefore judged uninteresting. It also reinvigorates philosophy with the dynamism and bodily relevance of the practice of dancing. Most important, it demonstrates the meaningful intersection of aesthetics and political ethics, by exploring how aesthetic practices underlie and inspire human flourishing. (shrink)

Hume discusses the distinction of reason to explain how we distinguish things inseparable, and so identical, e.g., the color and figure of a white globe. He says we note the respect in which the globe is similar to a white cube and dissimilar to a black sphere, and the respect in which it is dissimilar to the first and similar to the second. Unfortunately, Hume takes these differing respects of resemblance to be identical with the white globe itself. Contradiction results, (...) undermining his theory of abstraction. The way out is apparently to admit an intrinsic complexity in even simple things. (shrink)

My intellectual journey in philosophy proceeded along two mountainous paths that coincided at their base, but forked less than halfway up the incline. The first is that of my philosophical development, a steep but steady and continuous ascent. It began in my family, and accelerated in high school, art school, college, and graduate school. Those foundations propelled my philosophical research into the nature of rationality and its relation to the structure of the self, a long-term project focused on the Kantian (...) and Humean metaethical traditions in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. It would have been impossible to bring this project to completion without the anchor, compass, and conceptual mapping provided by my prior, longstanding involvement in the practice and theory of Vedic philosophy. The second path is that of my professional route through the field of academic philosophy, which branched onto a rocky detour in graduate school, followed by a short but steep ascent, followed next by a much steeper, sustained descent off that road, into the ravine, down in flames, and out of the profession. In order to reach the summit of the first path, I had to reach the nadir of the second. It was the right decision. My yoga practice cushioned my landing. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol. 52, number 1, pp.44-63. R.M. Nugayev, Kazan State |University, USSR. -/- THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY AS A DECISIVE ARGUMENT FAVORING EINSTEIN OVER LJRENTZ. -/- Abstract. Einstein’s papers on relativity, quantum theory and statistical mechanics were all part of a single research programme ; the aim was to unify mechanics and electrodynamics. It was this broader program – which eventually split into relativistic physics and quantummmechanics – that superseded Lorentz’s theory. The argument of this paper is (...) partly historical and partly methodological. A notion of “crossbred objects” – theoretical objects with contradictory properties which are part of the domain of application of two different research programs – is developed that explains the dynamics of revolutionary theory change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Epistemic Leaks and Epistemic Meltdowns: A Response to William Morris on Scepticism with Regard to Reason Mikael M. Karlsson I. In an excellent paper which appeared in the April, 1989 issue of this journal,2 William Morris attemptsto demonstrate thatthe arguments which make up Hume's notorious chapter, "Of scepticism with regard to reason, are, in the first place, coherent—both internally and with the overall strategy of the Treatise—and, in the (...) second place, successful. Morris' paper is an exercise in the noble art of what I style constructive exegesis, an enterprise to which many readers of Hume Studies, and myself as much as any, are committed. It is a guiding principle ofthis art that we donotunderstandaphilosophical textuntil we can interpret it in such a way as to render it both coherent and correct. From this point ofview, coherence and correctness are not as independent of one another as they may seem to be to others who are differently committed. Some texts, such as Hume's chapter, "Ofscepticism with regard to reason," are notoriously resistant to constructive exegesis, despite the formidable bag of tricks which scholars and interpreters have developed; so resistant, that in gloomier moments we may be brought to wonder about our interpretative enterprise itself. Constructive exegesis is indeed a strange, and peculiarly optimistic, enterprise. Someday, I imagine, in a leisurely moment, I will think more reflectively about the principles ofour art. But not now.6 As a fellow practitioner of constructive exegesis, I am in full sympathy with what Morris tries to do in his paper; and I think that he does contribute substantially to our understanding of what Hume is up to in the chapter, "Ofscepticism with regard to reason." The third section of Morris' paper is, in my judgement, particularly successful in showing how Hume's chapter fits into the larger framework of the Treatise: Hume is, we see, attacking both what Morris labels "intellectualist rationalism" and its counterpart, which we may call 'unmitigated scepticism', although the chapter's two main arguments go primarily to the former. I also think that Morris gives very helpful, Volume XVI Number 2 121 MIKAEL M. KARLSSON and to my mind accurate, accounts of these two arguments, which I dub, respectively, the epistemic leak argument, and the epistemic meltdown argument. However, I have personally never found either of these arguments remotely convincing; and I still do not, despite Morris' clarification and defense. In what follows, I shall indicate some ofthe reasons for my dissatisfaction.?. Theepistemicleakargumentpurportsto"prove"(in Hume's sense)that reason or demonstration cannot support knowledge. Morris rightlyreminds us that whatHume meansby knowledge is perfect assurance or conviction: Knowledge is, in short, subjective certainty. This has caused confusion, for this is not what we usually mean nowadays by knowledge; nor was it what people, philosophers included, generally meant prior to Descartes. In Hume itis the product ofthe attempttoresolve all epistemic statesintomental eventsorwhat he calls "perceptions." In any case, we must—as Morris rightly explains—be clear that the epistemic leak argument is aimed at showing that demonstration cannot supportperfect conviction. Inoutline, the argumentissimple: Itworks, asMorrismakes clear, by shifting attention away from the subject-matter or "objects" of demonstration, that is, relations of ideas, to the exercise of demonstrative reason by human agents. The necessity of relations of ideas may suggest to us that we can be certain about them. Against this, one may point out that people do err in the conclusions arrived at by demonstration; this presumably shows that our (rational) understandingis fallible. And once we recognize this, our confidence in any conclusion produced by exercising this facultyislessened—thus do we move from knowledge, or subjective certainty, toprobability: belief, or imperfect conviction. Arguments ofthis general type (we can call them, using Descartes' famous figure, Totten-apple arguments ) were around long before Hume, although they were more commonly directed against the senses than against reason. We find them in antiquity—in Plato and Sextus Empiricus, for instance —and in Descartes, in parallel passages in the Discourse on Method, the First Meditation and the Principles of Philosophy, wherein one can discern a version directed precisely against reason and demonstration.12 To find out what, if anything, Hume has... (shrink)